is substantial overlap of worry with anxiety (e.g., Stö ber, 1995) and depression (e.g., Andrews & Borkovec, 1988) . This makes it worthwhile to look for specific features of worry to further our understanding of its nature, functions, and origins.
In an early attempt to describe specific features of worry, Breznitz (1971) described worry as some kind of ''internal reality testing'' that starts when the individual experiences a threat concerning possible future events. Consequently, he posited that chronic worry was like an internal TOTE loop (Test-Operate-TestExit; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) with the Exit missing. Lost in thought, worriers postpone external reality testing and delay actions or even put them off. The ''tendency to put off or completely avoid an activity under one's control'' (Tuckman, 1991, p. 474 ) is called procrastination. Therefore, following Breznitz' (1971) analysis, worriers should show elevated levels of procrastination.
One potential reason for this procrastination may be that worriers have elevated evidence requirements (Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1991) . A relationship between worry and elevated evidence requirements was first suggested by a study on worry and decision making (Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka, & Borkovec, 1990 ). In a categorization task, high-worriers were slower to make decisions, particularly in conditions of high stimulus ambiguity. Metzger and colleagues explained their findings in terms of worriers' elevated fear of failure and greater concern for personal evaluation. Confronted with increasingly ambiguous stimuli, the worriers faced a situation in which there was no obviously correct response. All responses looked like wrong decisions. Hesitant of making mistakes, worriers chose to delay their decisions as long as possible. The findings by Metzger et al. were replicated by Tallis et al. (1991) , who noted that worriers ''need to be absolutely sure that they are doing 'the right thing' before a response can be made' ' (p. 22) . Either they know the perfect answer to the problem or they do not respond at all. Consequently, a recent study on worry and elevated evidence requirements suggests that worry is related to perfectionism (Pratt, Tallis, & Eysenck, 1997) .
Early conceptualizations of perfectionism suggested perfectionism to be a unidimensional construct (Burns, 1980) . In contrast, recent views have stressed that perfectionism is multidimensional in nature (Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990; Hewitt & Flett, 1991; Terry-Short, Owens, Slade, & Dewey, 1995) . With respect to worry and perfectionism, the approach taken by Frost et al. (1990) is of particular interest. All conceptualizations of perfectionism emphasize that perfectionists have excessively high personal standards. In addition, Frost and colleagues put forward that these standards are accompanied by tendencies for overly critical evaluations of one's own behavior, expressed in concern over mistakes and doubts about one's actions. Moreover, they posited that perfectionists place considerable value on parental expectations and criticism. Finally, they suggested that perfectionists tend to be overly organized. Excessive organization, however, turned out to be only loosely related to the other dimensions of Frost et al.'s conceptualization of perfectionism (Frost et al., 1990; Stö ber, 1998b) . Frost et al.'s (1990) conceptualization of perfectionism has three core dimensions: (a) concern over mistakes and doubts about actions, (b) parental expectations and criticism, and (c) excessively high personal standards (Stö ber, 1998b) . Relating these core dimensions to the findings of worry and elevated evidence requirements Pratt et al., 1997; Tallis et al., 1991) , one can formulate the following expectations: First, worriers report more concern over mistakes and doubts about actions than nonworriers . Second, worriers report greater parental expectations and criticism. Tallis (1990) speculated that elevated evidence requirements may be a result of parental rearing styles. Specifically, worriers may have had parents with high expectations who expressed strong disapproval when mistakes were made. For worriers, being right all the time was the only way to avoid parental disapproval. Third, worriers report higher personal standards than nonworriers, following the assumption that elevated evidence requirements may indicate excessively high personal standards (Pratt et al., 1997) .
However, two points need to be addressed. First, worry has shown intimate relationships with both anxiety and depression. An experimental study (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988) , for example, demonstrated that the experience of worry is always associated with anxiety and depression. Consequently, self-report measures of worry show correlations in the range of .40-.74 with self-report measures of anxiety and depression (e.g., Molina & Borkovec, 1994; Stö ber, 1995) . In addition, procrastination and perfectionism have shown significant relationships with both anxiety and depression (e.g., Antony, Purdon, Huta, & Swinson, 1998; McCown, Johnson, & Petzel, 1989; Minarik & Ahrens, 1996; Sené cal, Koestner, & Vallerand, 1995) . Therefore, if one wants to demonstrate that procrastination and perfectionism are specific features of worry, one has to control for anxiety and depression.
Second, one has to take into account that measures of worry differ with respect to primary focus. Consequently, they capture somewhat different aspects of worry. The two most widelyused worry measures are the Worry Domains Questionnaire (WDQ; Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1992) and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990) . The WDQ was constructed as a measure of nonpathological worry, that is, a measure of worry as experienced by ''normal'' individuals in everyday life. Consequently, the WDQ items present common worry topics such as leaving work unfinished, feeling unattractive, or running out of money. For each item, respondents indicate ''how much'' they worry about the respective topic. The WDQ is thus a measure of amount of worry.
3 In contrast, the PSWQ was constructed as a measure of worry as experienced by clients diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) . Consequently, in addition to amount of worry, PSWQ items reflect subjects' perceptions of their worry as excessive, persistent, uncontrollable, and distressing. Thus, the PSWQ is a measure of pathological worry.
Substantial correlations between WDQ and PSWQ (on average .63; Stö ber, 1998a) show that amount of worry and pathological worry are intimately related. Still, there are marked differences between the two aspects. As Davey (1993) demonstrated, amount of worry showed positive correlations with self-reported coping once trait anxiety was partialed out; pathological worry did not. In a study by Stö ber (1995), pathological worry was related to sleeping problems after partialling out trait anxiety; amount of worry was not. Finally, in a treatment study (Stö ber & Bittencourt, 1998) , reductions in pathological worry predicted clients' self-reported positive changes in experiencing and behavior; reductions in amount of worry did not. Therefore, to cover all aspects of worry, one has to measure both amount of worry and pathological worry.
With this in mind, the aim of the present study was as follows: First, we wanted to examine whether procrastination and perfectionism were related to worry and, if so, what dimensions of perfectionism showed the strongest associations. Second, we wanted to determine whether procrastination and perfectionism were specific characteristics of worry, by controlling for anxiety and depression. Third, we wanted to investigate whether there were differences with respect to amount of worry and pathological worry.
METHOD Participants
A sample of 185 students was recruited at the Free University of Berlin. Five participants were excluded because of substantial missing data, resulting in a final sample of N ϭ 180 students (136 women). The average age of the participants was 25.8 years (SD ϭ 5.7). All participants volunteered for participation in exchange for extra course credit.
Measures

Worry Domains Questionnaire (WDQ)
As a measure of amount of worry, we included the Worry Domains Questionnaire (WDQ) (Tallis et al., 1992; Tallis, Davey, & Bond, 1994 ; German translation by Stö ber, 1995). The WDQ is a 25-item measure that covers five domains of everyday worries, namely relationships, lack of confidence, aimless future, work incompetence, and financial issues (Joormann & Stö ber, 1997) . Each item presents a potential worry (e.g., ''That I will lose close friends'' or ''That my money will run out''). For each item, respondents indicate how much they worry on a 5-point scale ranging from not at all (0) to extremely (4).
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ)
As a measure of pathological worry, we included the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) (Meyer et al., 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1996 ; German translation by Stö ber, 1995). The PSWQ is a 16-item measure that covers statements about worry as experienced by clients diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder (e.g., ''Once I start worrying, I can't stop'' or ''My worries overwhelm me''). The PSWQ has a 5-point answer scale from not at all typical of me (1) to very typical of me (5).
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI)
As a measure of anxiety, we included the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988 ; German translation by Margraf & Ehlers, 1998 ).
The BAI comprises 21 items that cover a broad range of somatic and cognitive anxiety symptoms (e.g., numbness, feeling hot, or fear of losing control). In the original instruction, participants are asked to indicate how much they have been bothered by each symptom ''during the past week.'' Because we wanted to synchronize the BAI with the two worry measures, we modified the BAI instruction and answer format by asking participants to indicate on a 7-point scale from never (0) to almost always (6) how often they have been bothered by each symptom in general.
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
As a measure of depression, we included the 13-item short form of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck & Beck, 1972 ; German translation by Kammer, 1983) . 4 The BDI short form has been developed as a fast screening test for depression symptoms. The short and long forms of the BDI have shown correlations of .96 and .95 (Beck & Beck, 1972; Kammer, 1983) , respectively. In the publication by Beck and Beck (1972) , the instruction for the BDI short form asks respondents to indicate how they feel ''today, that is, right now.'' To synchronize with the previous measures, we administered the BDI short form with the same time frame as the BAI (see above). 5 
Tuckman Procrastination Scale (TPS)
As a measure of procrastination, we included the Tuckman Procrastination Scale (TPS) (Tuckman, 1991 ; our German translation). The TPS is a 16-item measure of the tendency to overly delay starting and finishing tasks and duties (e.g., ''When I have a deadline, I wait till the last minute,'' or ''Putting something off until tomorrow is not the way I do it,'' reverse-scored). The original TPS has a 4-point answer scale. In order to avoid confusion with too many different answer formats, we administered the TPS with the 5-point answer scale of the perfectionism measure (see below).
Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (FMPS)
To measure perfectionism, we included the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (FMPS) (Frost et al., 1990 ; our German translation). The FMPS is a 35-item measure with a 5-point answer scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). Psychometric analysis found that the 35 items are best subsumed to four 4 We are aware of the problems associated with using the term ''depression'' when referring to BDI scores in student samples (Coyne, 1994; Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen, & Ingram, 1987) . Whereas we agree that variations in students' BDI scores may well be irrelevant to an understanding of major depressive disorder, we do believe that findings from correlational research with college students are relevant to an understanding of depressive symptomatology (Vredenburg, Flett, & Krames, 1993, pp. 337-338) . Therefore, here and in the following, the term ''depression'' may be understood as an abbreviation for the more precise ''depressive symptomatology. '' 5 The reason for this ''synchronization'' was as follows. Without modification of BAI and BDI, we would have confounded construct measurement with time-frame measurement. Using the original answer formats would have resulted in a comparison of amount of worry and pathological worry in general with anxiety during the last week and depression today. Thus, any differences in the correlation patterns of worry, anxiety, and depression may have been attributed to construct, time frame, or some interaction of the two.
subscales (Stö ber, 1998b) : Concern over Mistakes and Doubts (CMD; 13 items), Parental Expectations and Criticism (PEC; 9 items), Personal Standards (PS; 7 items), and Organization (O; 6 items). The Organization subscale was not included in our analyses because it is only loosely related to the other subscales and is excluded when calculating FMPS total scores (Frost et al., 1990, pp. 454-456) . Moreover, it was unrelated to our hypotheses.
Aspiration Level Scale (ALS)
As an additional measure of personal standards, we included the Aspiration Level Scale (ALS) (Wieland-Eckelmann & Bö sel, 1987) . The ALS is a 10-item measure of the tendency to lower one's standards under stress (e.g., ''When I'm working under time pressure'' or ''When I have personal problems''). For the present study, the ALS was also administered with the 5-point answer scale of the FMPS. Table I presents means, standard deviations, and reliabilities (Cronbach's alphas) of all measures. All measures displayed alphas above .80, except the Personal Standards subscale and the Aspiration Level Scale. Still, with alphas well above .70, both measures showed reliabilities sufficient for research purposes (Carmines & Zeller, 1979) . Inspecting the distribution of BDI scores, we found substantial positive skewness. Consequently, BDI scores (X ϩ 1) were subjected to a logarithmic transformation (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1989) to meet the normality requirement of our statistical analyses. To investigate gender differences, the correlation matrices of the female participants were compared with those of the male participants by means of multiple sample analysis using LISREL analysis (Jö reskog & Sö rbom, 1989) . This yielded a significant X 2 test indicating that the two correlation matrices were not significantly different. Therefore, all analyses combined men and women. Screening the tolerance of all variables (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1989) , we found no multicollinearity among variables.
RESULTS
Zero-Order Correlations
In line with previous findings, the two worry measures showed a correlation of .62 (cf. Table I ). Moreover, both worry measures showed high correlations with anxiety and depression. Correlations ranged from .51 to .59, corroborating previous findings of substantial cooccurrence. Turning to the variables we expected to be characteristic features of worry (in the following called ''feature variables''), we found that both worry measures showed substantial correlations with procrastination and perfectionism. At the subscale level of the perfectionism measure, the two worry measures showed the highest association with concern over mistakes and doubts about actions (CMD). In comparison, the correlations with the other two perfectionism subscales were much smaller. From these, only the .26 correlation between amount of worry and parental expectations and criticism (PEC) may be noteworthy, particularly with respect to Tallis' (1990) supposition regarding different childhood experiences of worriers and nonworriers. The correlations between worry and personal standards (PS), however, were all of negligible size. Instead, both worry measures showed a substantial correlation with the Aspiration Level Scale, indicating that high-worriers have a greater tendency to lower their personal standards when under stress.
Yet, anxiety and depression showed the same correlational pattern as the two worry measures even though their correlations were somewhat lower in magnitude. Besides, all correlations described above were more pronounced for amount of worry (WDQ) than for pathological worry (PSWQ). Thus, two questions remained: (a) Are procrastination and perfectionism specific features of worry? (b) If so, for which of the two aspects of worry are they specific?
Partial Correlations
To answer these questions, three sets of partial correlations were computed. Set 1 comprised amount of worry, anxiety, and depression; set 2 comprised pathological worry, anxiety, and depression; and set 3 comprised amount of worry, pathological worry, anxiety, and depression. For sets 1 and 2, second-order partial correlations (i.e., correlations of each measure while holding the other two constant) with the feature variables were computed; for set 3, third-order partial correlations (i.e., correlations of each measure while holding the other three constant) with the feature variables were computed.
These computations revealed the following picture (Table II) . After controlling for anxiety and depression, amount of worry (WDQ) still displayed significant correlations with the same feature variables as in the zero-order correlations, except for personal standards (see set 1). In comparison, anxiety and depression showed only nonsignificant correlations with the feature variables after amount of worry was partialed out. For pathological worry (PSWQ), the case was quite different (see set 2). When controlling for anxiety and depression, pathological worry displayed only two significant correlations, namely with total perfectionism and with concern over mistakes. Moreover, anxiety and depression still showed small, but significant correlations with the feature variables after pathological worry was partialed out. Thus, all feature variables showed closer associations with amount of worry than with pathological worry. This became even more evident in set 3. Amount of worry still showed significant correlations with all feature variables (except personal standards) after pathological worry was additionally partialed out. Pathological worry, however, showed only one significant correlation (with concern over mistakes and doubts) after amount of worry was additionally partialed out. Anxiety and depression showed no unique relationships with the feature variables.
DISCUSSION
In sum, the analyses yielded three main results. First, worry showed reliable and substantial relationships with procrastination and perfectionism. With respect to the three core dimensions of perfectionism, as conceptualized by the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Frost et al., 1990; Stö ber, 1998b) , this holds primarily for the first dimension, concern over mistakes and doubts about actions. To a much lesser degree, amount of worry was also associated with the second dimension, parental expectations and criticism. In contrast, there was no substantial correlation with the third dimension, personal standards, suggesting that highworriers may not hold excessively high personal standards compared to low-worriers. On the contrary, as indicated by the Aspiration Level Scale (Wieland-Eckelmann & Bö sel, 1987) , high-worriers reported a significant greater tendency to lower their standards under stress. Second, these relationships were specific for worry, not for anxiety and depression. Third, regarding the aspects of worry, they were specific for amount of worry, not for pathological worry.
As to the first result, the correlations between worry and procrastination support Breznitz' (1971) theoretical analysis of worry. Moreover, the results on worry and perfectionism support the interpretation of the experimental findings on worry and elevated evidence requirements Pratt et al., 1997; Tallis et al., 1991) , namely that perfectionist concern over mistakes and doubts about actions may be responsible for worriers' procrastination and indecision. Moreover, the combination of concern over mistakes and procrastination may be a crucial factor in the maintenance of worry. On the one hand, it may prolong existing threats because no steps are taken to cope. On the other hand, it may increase existing threats or even produce additional threats because initially solvable problems will pile up, thus creating an overload of problems that may finally be insoluble (Tallis, 1990) .
With respect to potential origins of these decision problems, Tallis (1990) argued that worriers' elevated evidence requirements might be related to parental rearing styles. The present analysis corroborates this notion, as amount of worry showed a substantial correlation with the perfectionism subscale Parental Expectations and Criticism. Parental representations are probably not valid indicators of the actual parental behavior. First, there may be mood-and-memory effects (Bower, 1981) . Moreover, retrospective memories may be distorted in order to be congruent with a person's view of his or her present personality (Halverson, 1988) . Still, whether veridical or not, currently activated representations of early relationships with primary caregivers may be important for understanding normal and pathological characteristics and functioning, personality development, and self-concept (Blatt, Auerbach, & Levy, 1997; Pincus & Ruiz, 1997) . Therefore, the issue of parental representations and worry deserves further attention (Borkovec et al., 1998) .
In contrast, perfectionist personal standards did not show any meaningful correlations with worry. Instead, worry was significantly related to the tendency to lower one's standards when under stress. This suggests that worriers' elevated evidence requirements do not reflect perfectionist personal standards. Moreover, because excessive standards were not related to worry, the common therapeutic advice for perfectionists to lower their standards (Burns, 1980) would not work for worriers. Worriers do not want to be the best, they are just afraid of making mistakes.
As to the second result, previous research has found considerable overlap among worry, anxiety, and depression as well as significant relationships of anxiety and depression with procrastination and perfectionism (see the Introduction). Therefore, neither the high correlations of depression and anxiety with the two worry measures nor the significant correlations of depression and anxiety with procrastination and perfectionism are remarkable. What is remarkable, however, is that the latter correlations dropped to values around zero once worry (particularly amount of worry) was partialed out. This finding can be understood in terms of interpreting worry as ''anticipatory anxiety'' (Butler & Mathews, 1987) . If this future-directed cognitive component is extracted from anxiety (BAI) and depression (BDI), the remaining parts of anxiety (e.g., nervousness, hands trembling, inability to relax) and depression (e.g., sadness, guilt, self-dislike) are unrelated to procrastination and perfectionism. Thus, it is worry linking anxiety and depression to procrastination and perfectionism. Moreover, this indicates that worry is an important component not only of anxiety, but also of depression (Borkovec et al., 1998 ; Stö ber, in press). Consequently, cognitive research and therapy on depression may benefit from paying closer attention to worry.
As to the third result, the partial correlations with the two worry measures corroborate previous findings of marked differences between amount of worry and pathological worry (Davey, 1993; Stö ber, 1995; Stö ber & Bittencourt, 1998) . Perfectionism and procrastination were uniquely related to amount of worry, not to pathological worry. This finding may seem surprising, but may be explained by a closer look at the contents of the respective residuals. If amount of worry (WDQ) is extracted from pathological worry (PSWQ), the PSWQ residuals may capture only general distress or pathology. General distress, however, does not seem to be related to procrastination and perfectionism. In comparison, if pathological worry (PSWQ) is extracted from amount of worry (WDQ), the WDQ residuals may capture ''net worry,'' that is, total worry minus excessiveness, persistence, uncontrollability, and associated distress. Thus, procrastination and perfectionism relate to how much a person worries, independent of how he or she feels about his or her worrying.
The main limitations to the present study pertain to the following three points. First, with 136 female participants and 44 male participants, the present sample contained an extremely skewed sex ratio. Whereas our LISREL analysis did not find any differences between the correlation matrices of the two groups, future studies should include more male participants to substantiate the present findings for both sexes. Second, all data were correlational. Thus, the association among worry, procrastination, and perfectionism may have been due to a third variable. A likely candidate in this respect is social anxiety. Clients diagnosed with social phobia have shown elevated concern over mistakes and doubts about actions (Antony et al., 1998; Juster et al., 1996) , and our measure of amount of worry (WDQ) seems to capture mainly social-evaluative concerns (Eysenck & van Berkum, 1992) . So, it is perhaps not worry per se that is related to procrastination and perfectionism, but worry about being evaluated by others. Future studies may therefore include social anxiety as a further control variable. Third, all data were cross-sectional, so they do not allow causal inferences. Moreover, in the present case, they do not allow for causal modeling because of potential feedback loops between worry and the characteristic variables (Baron & Kenny, 1986) . Future studies on worry, procrastination, and perfectionism may therefore employ longitudinal designs (e.g., repeated assessment of worry and procrastination across an interval of several weeks, while controlling for anxiety and depression). Despite the above limitations, we believe that the present findings may provide a further step toward a more complete understanding of the nature, functions, and origins of worry.
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